The Relation between First-Order Performance and Metacognitive Judgments in Implicit Learning Research

• Applicant: Professorin Dr. Hilde Haider
• Subject Area: General, Cognitive and Mathematical Psychology
• Term: from 2018 to 2023
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 415700880

How conscious awareness about a sequence develops in an implicit learning situation is an important but not yet solved question (e.g. Cleeremans, 2014; Scott & Dienes, 2008; Esser & Haider, submitted). Our former findings suggest that strengthening of implicitly acquired representations is not sufficient to explain the emergence of consciousness in an implicit learning situation. Rather, and in line with the current discussion in the field of consciousness concerning Higher-Order Thought theories, we assume that implicit knowledge is represented in terms of first-order representations whereas conscious representations presuppose the generation of higher-order thoughts or metacognitive representations. In the last years, the interaction between first-order and metacognitive representations triggered a lot of research in many different domains (cf. decision making, Fleming & Daw, 2017). The central still open question here is whether first-order and higher-order judgments rely on the same signals. Alternatively, it is conceivable that former experiences in similar situations additionally modulate the metacognitive representations.The proposal comprises two series of experiments. The first series is aimed to investigate which information is integrated into metacognitive judgments. We assume that while performing a current task, participants develop an increasingly more stable metacognitive model of the situation. This model not only includes information derived from the first-order performance but also experiences made in similar situations. The second goal of this series then is to examine how metacognitive models of a current task are modulated by recognizing a discrepancy between predicted and experienced metacognitive judgements (prediction error). Building on these findings, we then turn to the question how conscious awareness emerges in an implicit learning situation. We assume that a large metacognitive prediction error in conjunction with a stable metacognitive model leads to a reappraisal of the validity of the current metacognitive model. Instead of adjusting the current model on the basis of the prediction error, an explicit search process for a better fitting model is triggered, which can lead to conscious insight into the acquired implicit sequence knowledge. The goal of this second series of experiments is to investigate whether and how the size of the prediction error modulates the development of conscious knowledge about the underlying sequence. Overall, the proposal contributes to our understanding of metacognitive judgments. Contrary to the usual binary decision tasks, implicit learning paradigms allow to investigate how former learning experiences might modulate the metacognitive judgments. Furthermore, the proposal will also contribute to our understanding of the interaction between unconscious and conscious knowledge.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants
• Co-Investigator: Dr. Sarah Esser