Rudolf Carnap, the Problem of Induction, and the Choice of Scientific Frameworks

• Applicant: Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Ph.D.
• Subject Area: History of Philosophy ; Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: since 2024
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 545054032

In Rudolf Carnap's examination of the inductive methodology of science, he challenged the idea that the justification of inductive methods is inherently at odds with logical empiricism, as it relies on a synthetic a priori assumption of uniformity. Carnap offered a logical alternative to frequentist probability, advocating for a probabilistic approach to uniformity, with the goal of classifying all probabilistic statements as analytical within inductive logic. By this, he suggested to "salvage" logical empiricism. It is, however, well-known that Carnap's rational reconstruction of the scientific methodology has shortcomings and gaps. This project has three central aims. First, to address the problem of proving that (his) systems of inductive logic allow for deriving a relevant probabilistic statement about uniformity that can be cashed out also for justifying inductive methods within logical and information theoretical accounts. Second, to show how meta-probabilistic reasoning and the problem of the choice of scientific frameworks is relevant for Carnap’s account of induction, and how his general methodological suggestions can help to overcome this problem. And, third, to work out the relevance of the problem of scientific framework selection in contemporary scientific methodology, to study ist pragmatic underpinnings, and to explore ist roots in a (putative) pragmatic tendency that one finds already in Carnap’s late philosophy.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants