Responsibility, Explanation, and the Exercise of Abilities.

• Applicant: Dr. David Heering
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy ; Practical Philosophy
• Term: since 2023
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 530558230

In virtue of what are agents responsible for their actions? In virtue of what, that is, can their actions be attributed to them in a way that sanctions praise and blame for those actions? This project aims to develop a novel theory of moral responsibility, according to which a person is responsible for what she does if, and only if, we can explain her action in terms of good reasons. What makes such an explanation possible is the exercise of the ability to respond to reasons. The project thereby directs attention to the relationship between our explanatory practice and our ascriptions of moral responsibility. The project opposes extant theories about how the relationship between reasons and actions grounds responsibility. These theories assume that the possession of the ability to respond to reasons is enough for moral responsibility. It is irrelevant, whether the agent exercises this ability or not. What is decisive for responsibility is whether someone "could have done otherwise" - regardless of why they did in fact act. The role played by rational explanation of action is neglected by such theories. This focus on possession-conditions - and the corresponding rejection of exercise-conditions - for moral responsibility has led to a striking lacuna in the literature concerning the explanatory role of reasons in the ascription of moral responsibility. My project fills this lacuna. It develops a model of what itis to explain actions in terms of reasons. And it integrates this model into a general theory of moral responsibility. This theory will also address the conditions in which we may hold agents responsible for acting against their best reasons. We should like to blame some immoral or irrational behavior, after all. My theory proposes that such behavior should be counted as the bad exercise of the ability to respond to reasons.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants