The Normativity of Emotions

• Applicant: Hichem Naar, Ph.D.
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: since 2022
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 516640754

This research aims at developing an account of the normative profile of emotions in a way that will shed light on their nature. Although emotions are often thought of as blind forces, they appear – like belief and action – to be subject to normative constraints of their own and reasons for which they can be formed. The working hypothesis of this research is that a carefully worked out account of the normativity of emotions can shed light on the nature of emotions in novel ways. To this end, the project will conduct the first sustained application of insights in the philosophy of normativity to the theory of emotion. It is expected that the immediate result of this inquiry will be the introduction of a promising theory of emotion that contrasts with dominant contemporary views in significant ways. In particular, the view to be developed contrasts with dominant accounts of emotions as purely representational or motivational states. After showing that these views do not accommodate the normative profile of emotions, the research project will develop an account of both reasons for emotions and emotions’ responsiveness to such reasons. This will in turn help remove possible theoretical reservations towards reasons for emotions. It is hypothesized that the distinctive normativity of emotions justifies a theory of them as irreducible to other mental states. A novel theory of emotions, according to which emotions are forms of commands or imperatives, will then be introduced and defended. This theory is expected to accommodate both the normative profile of emotions and the various points of analogy between emotions and actions that have been investigated in previous work (see DFG project "The Agency in Emotion").

• DFG Programme: Research Grants