Institutional rules and their effects on cabinet and ministerial durability in advanced democracies

• Applicant: Privatdozentin Dr. Elena Semenova
• Subject Area: Political Science
• Term: since 2022
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 469033183

Among the most consequential elements of constitutional design in democratic systems are the rules on parliamentary dissolution, presidential elections, and presidential powers. These rules condition the timing of elections; influence electoral accountability; and shape how politicians negotiate government formation, termination, and policy. Cabinet durability is one important measure of governmental stability that is impacted by the powers granted to various political actors. Nevertheless, very little scholarship has addressed the effects of constitutional provisions on ministerial and cabinet durability, despite the importance of understanding both factors in governmental stability. This research uses the literature on early elections, semi-presidentialism, cabinet replacement, and ministerial careers as a basis for addressing two innovative research questions: (1) How is cabinet durability impacted by parliamentary dissolution powers, semi-presidentialism (i.e., the existence of a popularly elected president), and presidential powers to dismiss cabinets and appoint ministers? (2) How do these factors affect the durability of the ministers in these cabinets? The novel aspect of this approach is its focus on both cabinets and their ministers. The project consists of three work packages. In the first work package, I will build three unique data collections, which will be used for quantitative analyses. The first dataset covers the range and scope of constitutional rules in 46 developed democracies since 1945. The second includes information for each country on cabinets and rules governing their termination. The third comprises individual-level data on the ministers who populate the cabinets of each country. These data will form the basis for two empirical studies. The first study (work package 2) looks at the effects of institutional rules on the likelihood of cabinet dissolution and cabinet replacement in developed democracies through the application of a competing risks framework and a semi-parametric Cox regression with shared frailties. The second study (work package 3) examines the effects of the same institutional rules on individual ministerial durability, measured as the time a minister has spent in any cabinet, using a conditional risk set Cox regression. I argue that cabinet and ministerial durability are impacted in distinct ways by the same sets of constitutional rules, and at times those effects differ. In some cases, the negative effects of certain constitutional rules on cabinet durability are even offset by their positive effects on the durability of individual ministers. Understanding these effects has theoretical implications for macro-level institutional choice and issues surrounding cabinet formation, electoral accountability, ministerial responsibility, and policy development.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants
• International Connection: Australia
• Cooperation Partner: Professor Dr. Keith Dowding
• Co-Investigator: Professor Dr. André Kaiser