Thick Concepts and Objectivity

• Applicant: Dr. Irina Schumski
• Subject Area: Practical Philosophy
• Term: from 2020 to 2022
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 447910514

This research project aims to examine a certain class of normative concepts – so-called “thick concepts” – with a view to answering the question of whether moral norms can be objectively valid and, if so, in what sense. While thin concepts, like „good“ or „obligatory”, are purely normative, thick concepts, like “cruel”, “courageous” or “loyal”, seem to somehow combine descriptive and normative content. Because of the fact that thick concepts seem to establish a very robust – if not inextricable – link between the is and the ought, there has been a number of 20th century philosophers (Philippa Foot, John McDowell, and Bernard Williams, to name a few) who have appealed to these concepts in order to show that values and norms can be objective. Of course, these thinkers are not alone in defending moral objectivism, but their thick concept approach to the question of objective norms and values seems particularly timely, given the plurality of moral outlooks and the pervasiveness of deep moral disagreement that we confront today. The reason why these phenomena lend credibility to the thick concept approach is that, unlike thin concepts, thick concepts tend to be bound up with specific cultures. As such, they raise questions that go beyond the simple question of whether objective moral norms are viable: questions concerning the kind of objectivity that we can dare to hope for, given the apparent culture-dependence of the “objects” at issue. The main aim of this research project is to breathe new life into this approach to moral objectivity after it has recently fallen into disrepute. To this end, I will first engage with the sceptics: those who deny that thick concepts can shed light on moral objectivity, or indeed on anything of philosophical significance. The group I have in mind are so-called deflationists about the thick who deny the inherent normativity of thick concepts. On their view, the meaning of thick concepts is purely descriptive. Accordingly, for them, these concepts are just as incapable of bridging the is-ought gap as any other descriptive concept would be. To counter this scepticism, I will scrutinize and criticize some of the main arguments that deflationists have put forward. I expect that, in addition to re-establishing the inherent normativity of thick concepts, this critical discussion might yield certain desiderata that a satisfactory non-deflationary account of thick concepts should satisfy. If I am right, then the next step would consist in evaluating various existing non-deflationary accounts of thick concepts and of how they combine the two aspects of their meaning on the basis of how well these accounts satisfy the above-mentioned desiderata. My hypothesis is that an inferentialist account will do best.

• DFG Programme: WBP Fellowship
• International Connection: United Kingdom
• Host: Professor Dr. Pekka Väyrynen