Belief, Credence, and Evidence

• Applicant: Dr. Dominik Kauss
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: from 2018 to 2020
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 398821307

This research project is intended to contribute to the ongoing debate in epistemology and the philosophy of mind regarding the relation between belief and credence (subjective probability). I will explore and compare the respective theoretical commitments of two major positions in that debate, viz. the Certainty View and the Threshold View. Whereas the Certainty View identifies belief in a proposition with assigning that proposition a credence of 1 (on a scale of 0 to 1), according to the Threshold View belief in a proposition consists in assigning it a credence somewhere above 0.5 but not necessarily as high as 1. The project will be structured into four segments. In Segment I, I will canvass objections to the Certainty View that question its descriptive and normative adequacy. In discussing these objections, I will connect the debate to the theory of presuppositions and the theory of default entitlement, utilizing resources from both areas to defend the Certainty View. In Segment II, I will address problems for the Threshold View resulting from the so-called Lottery Paradox, which seems to force the proponent of that view to abandon the doxastic norms of logical consistency and logical closure. Recently it has been suggested that this consequence can be evaded by adopting a suitably contextual account of the threshold of belief, and I will investigate this proposal in detail. In the remaining two segments, I will turn to problems that exist for both the Certainty View and the Threshold View. In Segment III, I will discuss to what extent each view is affected by the Preface Paradox and which ways out of that paradox are open to the respective view's proponent. Finally, in Segment IV, I will evaluate strategies for dealing with a recent antireductionist objection to the effect that reducing both belief and suspension of judgement to respective credences leads to violations of the probability calculus.I have developed the research project after consulting Prof. Stephen Yablo, who will be my mentor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), should this application be successful. The research fellowship is requested for a span of twelve months which I intend to spend at MIT in order to discuss my arguments and positions with thematically relevant philosophers. The aim of the project is the publication of four papers, one for each of the mentioned segments.

• DFG Programme: Research Fellowships
• International Connection: USA
• Host: Professor Dr. Stephen Yablo