The semantics and pragmatics of knowledge claims

• Applicant: Dr. Alexander Dinges
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: from 2016 to 2023
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 286062412

Our willingness to ascribe knowledge seems to depend on which error-possibilities we have in mind. Assume, for instance, that I looked up the departure times of my train a week ago. In such a situation, I might be willing to say that I know that my train will be leaving at, say, 2.40 p.m. But now assume that someone points out that the schedule may have changed and that I cannot rule out this possibility. Given that, I might no longer be willing to claim knowledge. I would rather recheck the schedule. Why is that so? Shouldn't our willingness to ascribe knowledge depend solely on the quality of our justification for the corresponding claim?Here is a related puzzle. It would sound absurd for me to say, "I know that my train will be leaving at 2.40 p.m., but it is possible that the schedule has changed (so that the train won't be leaving at 2.40 p.m.)." In general, it seems absurd to say, "I know that p, but it is possible that q," when q entails that p is false. This, however, seems to entail skepticism. For if we cannot know that p unless we can rule out all error-possibilities q, then there doesn't seem to be much knowledge left. With a little creativity, it is easy to find some error-possibility that we cannot rule out for every putative bit of knowledge.The following, familiar considerations also lead to skepticism: We cannot know that the world around us isn't just a dream. For if the dream was detailed and realistic enough, everything would appear exactly the way it appears in the actual world. But if we cannot know that the world around us isn't just a dream, then we can know hardly anything. We cannot even know that we have hands, for if we knew we had hands, we would also know that at least they are real. So should we accept skepticism after all? If we do, how can we explain our willingness to ascribe knowledge in ordinary conversations?This array of considerations and questions forms the basis of an entire range of views on the semantics and pragmatics of knowledge claims. Some philosophers argue that, in order to arrive at a coherent picture, we need to acknowledge that "knows" is a context-sensitive expression referring to more or less demanding epistemic relations depending on the context in which it is used. Others try to avoid this conclusion by taking the view that knowledge claims must not be taken literally on many occasions. Still others even go so far as to defend epistemic relativism. The overarching goal of my project is to reject semantically and pragmatically loaded positions of this kind and to defend a non-relativistic theory of knowledge according to which "knows" is not context-sensitive even though it can be taken literally on most occasions.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants