Conditional Responsiveness in France and Germany
Final Report Abstract
The basic premise of democratic governance is that government represents citizen wishes. In its simplest form, governments assess citizen wishes based on electoral outcomes and publicly expressed problems and respond to these demands by enacting laws. Citizens in turn readjust their priorities as policies change. This project examined if and when governments respond to citizen demands. Our main findings show that government responsiveness is not constant and not a given; instead it is conditioned on the political system and the political issues on the agenda. Using evidence from experiments and observational data, the project delivered three contributions: (1) individual politicians engage with their voters depending on the way they are elected. Politicians are more responsive when they are held directly accountable by constituents. Against our initial expectations, politicians are less responsive shortly before elections and when their electoral fortunes are threatened. (2) legislators also condition their response depending on the issue they faced. They are more responsive to marginal than to salient voter concerns. (3) economic context disrupts the connection between citizens and government. When economic conditions worsen, governments focus on legislation on economic and welfare issues. In addition to offering a more nuanced understanding of political responsiveness, the project relied on innovative research designs. Our investigation leveraged empirical insights from two sources. First, we tested the micro-level mechanisms at the government and citizen level. A mail survey, which entails an experimental design, investigates if elected representatives respond to different public demands. Second, we conduct a quantitative analysis of political activities using comparative policy agendas data. These data contribute to an international collaboration known as the Comparative Agendas Project and are publically available and widely used. In short, this project offered an important contribution to the understanding of when governments listen to public demands and provides evidence for the conditionality of responsiveness in Western democracies.
Publications
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2018. “Two Sides of the Same Coin? Congruence and Responsiveness as Representative Democracy’s Currencies.” Policy Studies Journal 46(S1): S13–47
Beyer, Daniela, and Miriam Hänni
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2019. Comparative Policy Agendas: Theory, Tools, Data. Oxford University Press
Baumgartner, Frank R., Christian Breunig, and Emiliano Grossman, eds.
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2020 “Responsiveness and Democratic Accountability: Observational Evidence from an Experiment in a Mixed-Member Proportional System.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
Breunig, Christian, Emiliano Grossman, and Miriam Hänni
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2020. “Die politische Agenda Deutschlands.” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 61(1): 131–49
Breunig, Christian, and Tinette Schnatterer
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2020. “The Diminishing Value of Representing the Disadvantaged: Between Group Representation and Individual Career Paths.” British Journal of Political Science: 1–18
Bailer, Stefanie, Christian Breunig, Nathalie Giger, and Andreas M. Wüst
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2021. “Policy Agendas in Germany – Database and Descriptive Insights.” The Journal of Legislative Studies
Breunig, Christian, Benjamin Guinaudeau, and Tinette Schnatterer
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“Social Status, Political Priorities and Unequal Representation.” European Journal of Political Research, Volume 61, 2022, 351-373
Traber, Denise, Miriam Hänni, Nathalie Giger, and Christian Breunig
