Cryptography beyond the black-box model
Final Report Abstract
The main goals of this project were to overcome the limitations of the black-box model in realworld scenarios and to design a sound theory for analyzing cryptographic implementations. The work done in this project significantly enhanced the state-of-the-art and contributed to the development of provably secure cryptographic implementations. In particular, we investigated side-channel attacks, fault-attacks, and hardware trojans. In all three areas, we developed sound security models and provided efficient countermeasures. In the following we briefly summarize our contribution. ● Side-channel resilience: We developed two practical-oriented verification tools to verify leakage resilience of algorithms and circuits: scVerif analyzes hardware-specific leakages and STRAPS analyzes the natural nature of noisy leakage. Additionally, we developed secure compilers to protect arbitrary cryptographic primitives against side-channel leakage. ● Tamper resilience: Faulty keys are a common problem that leads to various security vulnerabilities. We analyzed this security challenge and followed two research directions. First, we developed a non-malleable code that cannot be attacked by an adversary with bounded space. Finally, we constructed an authenticated encryption scheme that is resistant against functions from a given set of tamper functions. ● Trojan resilience: Similar to the approach of tamper resilience, we designed a secure compiler to protect arbitrary circuits against such attacks and we successfully worked on trojan resilient encryption schemes.
Publications
- Circuit Compilers with O(1/\log (n)) Leakage Rate. EUROCRYPT 2016
M. Andrychowicz, S. Dziembowski, S. Faust
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49896-5_21) - Private Circuits III: Hardware Trojan-Resilience via Testing Amplification. CCS 2016
S. Dziembowski, S. Faust, F.-X. Standaert
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978419) - Amortizing Randomness Complexity in Private Circuits. ASIACRYPT 2017
S. Faust, C. Paglialonga, T. Schneider
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_27) - Non-Malleable Codes for Space-Bounded Tampering. CRYPTO 2017
S. Faust, K. Hostáková, P. Mukherjee, D. Venturi
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63715-0_4) - Composable Masking Schemes in the Presence of Physical Defaults & the Robust Probing Model. CHES 2018
S. Faust, V. Grosso, S. M. Del Pozo, C. Paglialonga, F.-X. Standaert
(See online at https://doi.org/10.13154/tches.v2018.i3.89-120) - General State Channel Networks. CCS 2018
S. Dziembowski, S. Faust, K. Hostáková
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243856) - Simple Refreshing in the Noisy Leakage Model. ASIACRYPT 2019
S. Dziembowski, S. Faust, K. Zebrowski
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_11) - Unifying Leakage Models: From Probing Attacks to Noisy Leakage. J. Cryptol 2019
A. Duc, S. Dziembowski, S. Faust
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-018-9284-1) - Deterministic Wallets in a Quantum World. CCS 2020
N. A. Alkadri, P. Das, A. Erwig, S. Faust, J. Krämer, S. Riahi, P. Struck
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3423361) - Fuzzy Asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. ASIACRYPT 2020
A. Erwig, J. Hesse, M. Orlt, S. Riahi
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64834-3_26) - Masking in Fine-Grained Leakage Models: Construction, Implementation and Verification. CHES 2021
G. Barthe, M. Gourjon, B. Grégoire, M. Orlt, C. Paglialonga, L. Porth
(See online at https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i2.189-228) - Towards Tight Random Probing Security. CRYPTO 2021
G. Cassiers, S. Faust, M. Orlt, F.-X. Standaert
(See online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_7)
