What's the use of emotions in classical pragmatism? A critical analysis of 'experience' and 'action' in the works of John Dewey and Charles S. Peirce (with an eye to clarifying normative aspects of human-animal relationships)

• Applicant: Dr. Mara-Daria Cojocaru
• Subject Area: Practical Philosophy
• Term: from 2015 to 2016
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 277447342

It is well known that classical philosophical pragmatism claimed being able to focus philosophical inquiry on supposedly real problems, and by doing so to improve human experience in the broadest sense. The success of this endeavor relied on its conception of how thought and action were inherently linked. Moreover, classical pragmatism is also known for a certain unorthodox approach towards the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, e.g. championing a (notorious) primacy of practice. At the same time there is little consensus on whether there is a unity to be found across the different pragmatist works. Especially, when it comes to practical philosophy, the implications of pragmatism are indeed an open question; and the problems arising from human-animal-relations are a very good example. Hence, inasmuch as mainstream academic animal ethics has reached a dead end, in particular with respect to its impact on sociopolitical practices, it is my aim to show that pragmatism is in a position to improve the debates by focusing on some of its metaphysical and epistemological tenets. This is in tune with some of the recent developments in theoretical philosophy; however, the gist should be acknowledging humans as genuinely pragmatic creatures, which means creatures who cannot but act and who, as it were, should therefore try to act better. The philosophy of emotion now acts as an intermediary between questions that are usually understood to belong to theoretical philosophy and those that are seen to fall into the sphere of practical philosophy. In fact, in recent research important similarities between pragmatist ideas, concerning the nature of experience and the role of emotions therein, and contemporary conceptions of emotions have emerged. I want to use these in order to construe a case in favor of a unitary conception of the classical pragmatism that can be found in Peirce and Dewey. I will proceed by reconstructing and criticizing the role of emotions in their respective works. Next, I will inquire into the related problems in ethics (e.g. with respect to the question of how ethics can influence and can be influenced by individual normative judgment) and in metaethics (importantly with respect to the question of a pragmatic metaethical realism). On top of that, notwithstanding the acknowledged importance of social and political institutions for succesful actions (and inquiry), there is a very interesting momentum present both in Peirce and Dewey that stresses the importance of individual (quasi-virtuous) conduct, which seems to be related to the role of emotions as well; however, a more detailed analysis is needed. Finally, with respect to my project as a whole it is of utmost importance to me to use this research fellowship in order to state some of my methodological commitments more precisely.

• DFG Programme: Research Fellowships
• International Connection: United Kingdom
• Hosts: Professor Dr. Christopher Hookway; Professor Dr. Robert Stern