Internalist Theories of Intentionality and Modal Cognition

• Applicant: Dr. Jens Kipper
• Subject Area: Theoretical Philosophy
• Term: from 2015 to 2016
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 265271480

Theories of intentionality try to explain in virtue of what mental states such as beliefs and desires are capable of relating to the world. For a long time, internalist theories had been dominant, according to which the contents of mental states are completely determined by what occurs inside a person's head. In previous decades, however, externalist accounts have become prevalent, which state that these contents also depend on external circumstances. The decline of internalism was accompanied by that of another traditional view, according to which modal facts, i.e., facts about what is possible or necessary, can be known by non-empirical means, purely a priori. The first goal of the research project is to investigate the relation between these two theses. After that, the viability of an internalist account that is compatible with our having a priori access to modal facts will be examined.

• DFG Programme: Research Fellowships
• International Connection: USA
• Host: Professor Dr. Alex Byrne