The personal(ized) vote and parliamentary representation

• Applicant: Thomas Däubler, Ph.D.
• Subject Area: Political Science
• Term: from 2014 to 2018
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 263496525

Electoral systems define how voters choose among political parties and candidates, and as a consequence also affect how re-election-seeking representatives will behave in office. The design of electoral systems therefore shapes the extent to which representation is based on persons on the one hand and on parties on the other. Existing work on the consequences of electoral systems for personal representation has provided important insights, but suffers from both theoretical and methodological weaknesses. With regard to theory, it is usually assumed that re-election-seeking is the only motivation of representatives to appeal on personal grounds. Most studies consider only a single personal vote-seeking activity and also fail to explicitly address the implications of personal representation for party-based representation. In terms of methodology, cross-national studies struggle with separating effects of electoral system type from those of other country-level variables. The proposed project will address the theoretical shortcomings by distinguishing two underlying motivations of representatives, looking at several types of representation efforts and treating personal and party focus as two separate, but interrelated dimensions of representation. The empirical analysis will exploit intra-country variation in direct measures of electoral incentives, by considering two countries that recently "personalized" specific rules of their flexible list electoral systems. The aims of the project are to understand how two motivations - pursuing re-election as such and fostering personal reputation through electoral performance more widely - shape incentives to focus on personal constituents on the one hand and on candidate selectors within the party on the other. The project will examine how these general (and unobservable) incentives are translated into specific and observable choices of parliamentary actions. In order to realize these goals, the project will develop formal principal-agent models that allow to derive predictions for the number and type of activities chosen, the topics covered, and the policy positions taken. The predictions will be assessed with data from the Czech Republic and Sweden. These countries use flexible list electoral systems, under which the relative value of list rank and personal votes depends on specific electoral rules and the extent to which voters make use of the optional vote for candidates. Reforms of those rules, in interaction with voters' inclination to use the candidate vote option, create variation in electoral incentives within a country. This variation can effectively be used to study how "personalization" incentives affect what representatives do and to whom they respond. While giving voters more say in deciding which specific candidates will obtain seats is desirable as such, it is important to examine the wider consequences of such institutional designs.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants