An investigation into the acceptance and the opposition of food inspection officers and food businesses towards disclosure regimes

• Applicant: Professor Dr. Norbert Hirschauer
• Subject Area: Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Policy, Agricultural Sociology
• Term: from 2011 to 2021
• Project identifier: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - Project number 203552599

From a regulatory perspective, adverse outcomes associated with deviance represent negative externalities that are caused by the breaking of rules designed to prevent them. From a rational choice perspective, the probability of malpractice increases with the benefits for its authors. It decreases with the probability of detection and resulting losses. It also decreases with bonds to social norms that protect producers from yielding to economic temptations. The design of mechanisms that reduce behavioural risks and prevent malpractice requires an understanFding of why food businesses obey or not obey the rules. Our first-time project contributed to a better understanding of malpractice on the restaurant/retail level through a statistical analyses of food inspection results and food businesses survey data. The results show that not only economic incentives but also social and psychological factors influence compliance behaviour. Furthermore, we found evidence that the disclosure system in Berlin provides incentives that have significant potential to increase compliance. Still, there is a considerable number of opponents of disclosure systems among businesses, administrators and policy makers. The strong opposition resulted in the suspension of the disclosure pilot projects in Berlin in 2014. Therefore, new and policy relevant research question arise: What are the main factors that make certain social actors reject/support disclosure policies? And what is the set of actions available to these opponents. If we understand the reasons for rejection of the system, we can suggest measures that have the potential to increase the support of the system (e.g. informational campaigns, modified designs of disclosure schemes). We will analyse the factors that affect the attitude of two influential lobbying groups: the food businesses and the food inspectors. We will also continue our study of behavioural determinants by considering the inspectors evaluations regarding the factors and regulatory measures (including disclosure schemes) that promote business compliance and with it food safety.

• DFG Programme: Research Grants